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SEVEN

Corporate Taxation and International Competition
James R. Hines Jr.
University ofMichigan and NBER

1. Introduction
Many countries tax corporate income heavily despite the incentives that
they face to reduce tax rates in order to attract greater investment, particularly investment from foreign sources. The volume of world foreign direct
investment (FDI) has grown enormously since 1980, thereby increasing a
country's ability to attract significant levels of new investment by reducing
corporate taxation. The evidence indicates, however, that corporate tax collections are remarkably persistent relative to gross domestic product (GDP),
government revenues, or other indicators of underlying economic activity
or government need. If this were not true- if corporate income taxation were
rapidly disappearing around the world - then such a development might
be easily explained by pointing to competitive pressures to attract foreign
investment and retain domestic investment. Hence, the question remains
why growing international capital mobility has not significantly reduced
reliance on corporate income taxation.
There are at least three possible resolutions of this puzzle, of which the
simplest is that the continued taxation of corporate income at high rates
reflects the politics of tax policy formation. Corporate taxation may be
popular because its incidence is so uncertain, leading large numbers ofvoters
and various interest groups to conclude that others, and not they, bear the
burden of this tax. If this political phenomenon is important, then it would
explain why greater international capital mobility might not be accompanied
by sharp tax reductions around the world. Even when governments do not

I thank Justin Garosi and Claudia Martinez for excellent research assistance, and Jack Mintz, Jay
Wilson, other conference participants, and an anonymous referee for very helpful comments
and suggestions.
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explicitly incorporate capital mobility in their deliberations over capital tax
policies, capital mobility influences tax collections, tax revenue projections,
and the observable experience of other countries. Hence there is ample scope
for indirect effects of capital mobility on national tax policies, even in an
environment that is largely dominated by distributional politics.
The second possible explanation for continued high rates of corporate
taxation in an era of significant international capital mobility is that governments do not have incentives to reduce their taxation of mobile capital. This
might be the case if, for example, the volume, location, and performance of
FDI were insensitive to taxation. A large body of evidence suggests, however,
that exactly the opposite is the case - international investment and international tax avoidance are strongly influenced by tax policies. Hence, there
is every reason to expect countries to penefit from tax reductions as capital
becomes more internationally mobile.
The third possible explanation is that countries subtly distinguish between
more mobile and less mobile capital, subjecting the former to lower rates
of taxation than the latter. Such a strategy permits tax systems to collect
significant revenue from less mobile investments while affording highly
mobile investments the benefits of reduced rates. This differentiation of tax
burdens can be accomplished in any of several ways, of which the most
obvious is negotiated tax reductions for certain investors. Other methods
of favoring mobile investments include generous tax treatment of certain
industries and rules that permit multinational firms to avoid taxes by using
carefully constructed transactions with affiliates in tax haven countries. 1
While it might or might not be in a country's interest to continue taxing
income earned by less mobile investments, whose volume and performance
are undoubtedly influenced by taxation, it is clear that, for any given average
level of corporate taxation, reducing the relative burden on more mobile
capital improves efficiency.
The evidence suggests that countries have responded to greater international capital mobility by reducing the relative (and absolute) taxation of
international investors while continuing to tax domestic investments at high
rates. Statutory corporate tax rates fell noticeably since the early 1980s, but
were accompanied by tax base broadening that maintained or even slightly

1

The tax deductibility of interest expenses implies that there is no corporate tax burden on
marginal debt-financed investments. Hence, to the extent that international debt investments are more mobile than international equity investments, the imposition of a high
statutory corporate tax rate itself may impose a greater burden on less mobile equity
investments than it does on more mobile debt investments.
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increased overall average corporate tax burdens. Foreign investors, however, were increasingly relieved of corporate tax burdens, as evidenced by
the foreign affiliates of U.S. firms, which faced average foreign tax rates
of 43 percent in 1982 but only 26 percent by 1999. In drawing attention
·to the divergent paths of corporate tax revenues and the income tax burdens offoreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinational firms, Desai (1999) suggests that foreign tax practices are designed to distinguish between mobile
and less mobile capital, offering increasingly attractive terms to mobile
capital.
The cross-sectional pattern of corporate income taxation likewise displays
aspects of increasing competition for mobile economic resources. Small
countries generally face more elastic supplies of world capital than do large
countries, because small countries are more likely to be price takers in world
markets. As a result, the efficient source-based tax on mobile capital is lower
for smaller countries, and indeed, the efficient capital income tax rate is zero
for a very small country facing an infinitely elastic supply of world capital.
The data reveal a change over time in the extent to which country size is
correlated with tax rates. In 1982, there was a strong positive correlation
between tax rates and country size, but by 1999 this correlation had largely
disappeared. Progressive elimination of the effects of country sizes on corporate tax rates is one of the implications of intensified international tax
competition, since it is the ability to exploit market power that permits large
countries to benefit from higher tax rates. Consequently, the evolution of
corporate taxation in the period of globalization is properly understood as
reflecting increased competition for mobile resources.
Section 2 of this chapter reviews evidence of rising international capital
mobility and the sensitivity of corporate activity to tax policies. Section 3
considers the implications of tax competition for international tax rate setting and cross-country evidence of the evolution of corporate taxation.
Section 4 analyzes the determinants of statutory and effective corporate tax
rates in 1982 and 1999. Section 5 is the conclusion.
2. Taxation and International Capital Mobility
The potential economic impact of international tax differences increased
significantly in the modern era due to the marked growth of FDI. Figure 1
plots annual ratios of total world outbound FDI to total world income, as
reported by the World Bank's World Development Indicators. As the figure
indicates, FDI increased rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s. While the evidence
of growing FDI does not by itself demonstrate that tax policies influence
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Figure 1. World Foreign Direct Investment as a Percent of World Product, 1970-2001
Note: The figure depicts annual ratios (measured in percent) of total world foreign direct investment to the sum of GDP
for all countries.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.
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the magnitude and performance of international investment, there is ample
separate evidence that they do. 2
The available evidence of the effect of taxation on FDI comes in two
forms. The first is time-series estimation of the responsiveness of FDI to
annual variation in after-tax rates of return. Implicit in this estimation is a
q-style investment model in which contemporaneous average after-tax rates
of return serve as proxies for returns to marginal FDI. Studies of this type
consistently report a positive correlation between levels ofFDI and after-tax
rates of return at industry and country levels. 3 The implied elasticity ofFDI
with respect to after-tax returns is generally close to unity, which translates
into a tax elasticity of investment of roughly -0.6. The estimated elasticity is
similar whether the investment in question is U.S. direct investment abroad
or FDI by foreigners in the United States.
The primary limitation of aggregate time-series studies is that they are
largely identified by yearly variation in taxes or profitability that may be
correlated with important omitted variables. As a result, it becomes very
difficult to identify the effects of taxation separately from the effects of
other variables that are correlated with tax rates. Exceptions include Slemrod
(1990 ), who distinguishes FDI in the United States by the tax regime in the
country of origin, and Swenson (1994), who distinguishes investment by
industry.
Other studies of investment location are exclusively cross-sectional in
nature, exploiting the very large differences in corporate tax rates around
the world to identify the effects of taxes on FDI. Grubert and Mutti (1991)
and Hines and Rice (1994) estimate the effect of national tax rates on the
cross-sectional distribution of aggregate U.S.-owned property, plant, and
equipment (PPE) in 1982. Grubert and Mutti analyze the distribution of
PPE in manufacturing affiliates in 33 countries, reporting a -0.1 elasticity
with respect to local tax rates. Hines and Rice consider the distribution of
PPE in all affiliates in 73 countries, reporting a much larger, -1, elasticity
of PPE ownership with respect to tax rates. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004a)
report that high rates of indirect taxation have effects that are similar in sign
and magnitude to high rates of corporate income taxation in depressing
FDI by U.S. firms in data for 1982, 1989, and 1994. Altshuler, Grubert, and
Newlon (2001) compare the tax sensitivity of aggregate PPE ownership in
58 countries in 1984 to that in 1992, reporting estimated tax elasticities
2

3

See Hines (1997, 1999) for further elaboration and critical analysis ofmanyofthe studies
surveyed in this section. This section draws on material from Hines (2005).
See, for example, Hartman (1984), Boskin and Gale (1987), and Young (1988).
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that rise (in absolute value) from -1.5 in 1984 to -2.8 in 1992. Altshuler
and Grubert (2004) offer evidence of a -3.5 tax elasticity of investment
in a sample of 58 countries in 2000, suggesting a continued, and possibly
increasing, responsiveness to foreign tax differences. 4
One of the important issues in considering the impact of taxation on
international investment patterns is the ability of multinational firms to
adjust the location of their taxable profits. It is often attractive to use debt to
finance foreign affiliates in high-tax countries and to use equity to finance
affiliates in low-tax countries, thereby accumulating income where tax rates
are low and deductions where tax rates are high. 5 The evidence is broadly
consistent with these incentives. Hines and Hubbard (1990) find that the
average foreign tax rate paid by subsidiaries remitting nonzero interest to
their U.S. parent firms in 1984 exceeds the average foreign tax rate paid
by subsidiaries with no interest payments, while the reverse pattern holds
for dividend payments. Grubert (1998) estimates separate equations for
dividend, interest, and royalty payments by 3,467 foreign subsidiaries to
their parent U.S. companies (and other members of controlled groups)
in 1990, finding that high corporate tax rates in countries in which U.S.
subsidiaries are located are correlated with higher interest payments and
lower dividend payout rates. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004b) report that,
within groups of affiliates controlled by the same U.S. parents, debt levels
are significantly higher among affiliates located in countries with higher tax
rates.
Contractual arrangements between related parties located in countries
with different tax rates offer numerous possibilities for sophisticated tax
avoidance. Evidence of tax-motivated income reallocation comes in several
forms. Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) analyze the
4

5

Other cross-sectional evidence is consistent with these findings. Hines (200 1) compares the
distribution of}apanese and U.S. FDI around the world, finding Japanese investment to be
concentrated in countries with which Japan has "tax sparing" agreements that reduce homecountry taxation of foreign income; the estimated FDI impact of"tax sparing" is consistent
with estimated large tax elasticities of foreign investment. Within the United States, Hines
(1996) compares the distributions of FDI of investors whose home governments grant
foreign tax credits for federal and state income taxes with those whose home governments do
not tax income earned in the United States. One percent state tax rate differences in 1987 are
associated with 10 percent differences in amounts of manufacturing PPE owned by investors
from countries with differing home-country taxation of foreign-source income, and 3 percent differences in numbers of affiliates owned, implying a tax elasticity of investment equal
to -0.6.
Hines ( 1994) identifies exceptions to this rule that stem from the benefits oflimiting equity
finance in affiliates located in countries with very low tax rates in anticipation of reinvesting
all of their after-tax profits over long periods.
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aggregate reported profitabilities of U.S affiliates in different foreign locations in 1982. Grubert and Mutti examine profit/equity and profit/sales
ratios of U.S.-owned manufacturing affiliates in 29 countries, while Hines
and Rice regress the profitability of all U.S.-owned affiliates in 59 countries against capital and labor inputs and local productivities. Grubert and
Mutti report that high taxes reduce the reported after-tax profitability of
local operations; Hines and Rice come to a similar conclusion, their data
indicating that 1 percent tax rate differences are associated with 2.3 percent
differences in pre-tax profitability. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006) find that
foreign affiliates whose parent companies have nearby tax haven operations
pay lower taxes as a fraction of sales than do other affiliates. While it is possible that high tax rates are correlated with other locational and firm-specific
attributes that depress the profitability of foreign investment, competitive
conditions typically imply that after-tax rates of return should be equal in
the absence of tax-motivated income reallocation. The negative correlation
of pre-tax profitability and local tax rates, together with the negative correlation of tax payments and ownership of foreign tax haven affiliates, is
suggestive of active tax avoidance.
Harris et al. (1993) report that the U.S. tax liabilities of U.S. firms with
tax haven affiliates are significantly lower than those of otherwise similar
U.S. firms over the 1984-1988 period, which may be indirect evidence of
aggressive income reallocation by firms with tax haven affiliates. Collins,
Kemsley, and Lang (1998) analyze a pooled sample of U.S. multinationals
over 1984-1992, finding a similar pattern of greater reported foreign profitability (normalized by foreign sales) among firms facing foreign tax rates
below the U.S. rate. And Klassen, Lang, and Wolfson (1993) find that American multinationals report returns on equity in the United States that rose
by 10 percent relative to reported equity returns in their foreign operations
following the U.S. tax rate reduction in 1986.
Patterns of reported profitability are consistent with other indicators of
aggressive tax -avoidance behavior, such as the use of royalties to remit profits
from abroad and to generate tax deductions in host countries. Hines ( 1995)
finds that royalty payments from foreign affiliates of U.S. companies in
1989 exhibit a -0.4 elasticity with respect to the tax cost of paying royalties,
and Grubert ( 1998) likewise reports significant effects of tax rates on royalty
payments by U.S. affiliates in 1990. Clausing (200 1) finds that reported trade
patterns between U.S. parent companies and their foreign affiliates, and
those between foreign affiliates located in different countries, are consistent
with incentives to reallocate taxable income. Controlling for various affiliate
characteristics, including their trade balances with unaffiliated foreigners,
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Clausing finds that 10 percent higher local tax rates are associated with
4.4 percent higher parent company trade surpluses with their local affiliates,
which is suggestive of pricing practices that move taxable profits out ofhightax jurisdictions. Swenson (2001) finds a similar pattern in the reported
prices of goods imported into the United States, in which high unit tariff
rates appear to be associated with unusually low prices.
Taken together, this evidence implies that the volume ofFDI, and accompanying economic activity and corporate tax bases, is highly responsive to
local tax policies. It follows that countries contemplating lowering their
corporate income tax rates can reasonably expect to receive greater foreign
investment as a consequence. The incentive to reduce corporate tax rates in
order to attract FDI has increased since the early 1980s, as levels of world
FDI rose sharply during that time. The next section considers some of the
implications of these developments for tax rate setting around the world.

3. International Tax Competition
Greater mobility of corporate economic activity produces incentives to
reduce tax rates, particularly in small countries that face the most elastic
supplies of foreign capital. This section considers the implications of simple
models of tax rate setting in open economies and the available evidence of
country reactions to these incentives.

3.1. Implications of Capital Mobility
Modern analysis of the corporate tax rate implications of international capital mobility dates to Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), who demonstrate that
efficient taxation in a small, open economy entails zero taxation of income
earned by foreign investors. The explanation for their result is that any positive taxation distorts the economy more than would other tax alternatives,
without shifting any of the tax burden to foreign investors. 6 If international
capital flows are increasingly sensitive to tax rate differences, then incentives
to reduce tax rates are presumably rising as well. The analysis also implies
that countries that nevertheless persist in taxing income earned by foreign
investors will have lower incomes than those that do not.
The Diamond and Mirrlees result is commonly thought to imply that
small countries have the least to gain from attempting to impose taxes on
6

See Gordon (1986) for an elaboration of this argument, and Gordon and Hines (2002) for
a further exposition.
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foreign investment. Larger countries are able to extract some rents from
foreign investors because prices in their economies need not respond to
tax policies in a way that maintains unchanged the investors' after-tax profit
margins. Possibly weighing against this is strategic competition among large
countries, whose tax policies may be designed in a way that reflects their
likely effects on the policies of other countries. Another consideration is that
the inability to tailor tax and other policies perfectly might change efficient
levels of corporate taxation from what they would be in the absence of other
distortions. For example, trade barriers may distort local prices and thereby
influence the efficient taxation of foreign direct investment. If countries
are unable to impose corrective taxes or subsidies on externality-producing
activities of corporations, then modifications to corporate income tax rates
might serve as indirect remedies. Similarly, if personal income taxation cannot be tailored to achieve efficient redistribution, then there may be circumstances in which efficient third-best tax policies might include distortionary
corporate taxes. Finally, large countries might have personal income tax
rates that differ from those in small countries. Efforts to align top personal
and corporate tax rates in order to prevent tax arbitrage would then produce
correlations between corporate tax rates and country sizes that stem from
the determinants of personal income tax rates rather than efficient taxation
of inbound foreign investment.
Small countries are generally thought to face the most elastic corporate
tax bases and therefore to have the strongest incentives to offer low corporate tax rates, despite possible mitigating factors such as strategic behavior
and distortions induced by other policies. While there are few tests of the
proposition that the supply of capital to small countries is more elastic
than the supply of capital to large countries, this is more than a matter of
faith, because, in most models, it follows as an implication of their relatively
small domestic corporate tax bases. Whether countries actually design their
policies based on these assumed elasticities is another matter.
3.2. Evidence of Country Reactions
Numerous studies have called attention to the significance of falling rates
of corporate taxation around the world. Griffith and Klemm (2004) offer a
recent survey of this literature, along with their own calculations showing
that, while statutory corporate tax rates have declined, effective corporate
tax burdens in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
( OECD) countries have remained roughly unchanged since the early 1980s.
Thus, corporate tax revenues have remained constant, or even slightly risen,
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as a fraction of GDP in OECD countries. Corporate tax revenues as a fraction
of total government tax revenues likewise remained roughly constant among
OECD countries between 1980 and 2000. Keen and Simone (2004) note
that the resiliency of corporate tax collections among OECD countries is
not mirrored in the experience of developing countries, whose effective
taxation of corporate income appears to have fallen between 1990 and 2001,
due in part to the proliferation of tax holidays and other incentives directed
at foreign investors.
The experience of U.S. multinational firms, whose foreign investments
and foreign profitability are highly concentrated in OECD countries, is very
differentthan that suggested by the aggregate OECD data. Desai (1999) notes
that foreign taxes paid by U.S. firms began falling (as a fraction of income)
in the mid -1980s, roughly coincident with passage of the U.S. Tax Reform
Act of 1986. Altshuler and Grubert (2004) document a continued decline
in average foreign tax rates faced by large controlled foreign corporations, a
subset of the foreign affiliates of U.S. firms. Because average effective foreign
tax rates may reflect endogenous taxpayer behavior as well as official action
by foreign governments, it is not always easy to identify the source of tax
reductions. One of the benefits ofU.S. data, however, is that they are collected
on a consistent basis over time, using unchanging tax base definitions, so
falling effective tax rates are likely to correspond to reductions in actual
tax burdens. Desai (1999) draws the very plausible conclusion from these
patterns that foreign governments responded to increasing capital mobility
and the implications of U.S. tax rate reductions by lowering their effective
taxation of U.S. investors.
A number of studies probe the recent international experience for indications of the course of tax competition. Chennells and Griffith ( 1997) analyze tax rate setting among 10 OECD countries, reporting no evidence that
smaller, more open countries tax capital at lower rates than do larger countries. Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2002) report indications of tax
policy interdependence among these 10 countries, in that they tend to mimic
each other's statutory tax rate changes, which might represent a form of tax
competition, though it could alternatively reflect policy coordination. Devereux, Griffith, and Klemm (2002) interpret the recent decline in statutory
corporate tax rates together with roughly stable corporate tax collections
as efforts on the part of governments to attract productive investments,
and reported (taxable) income, from highly profitable multinational firms.
Bretschger and Hettich (2002) revisit the relationship between country size
and corporate tax rates in a panel of 14 OECD countries between 1967
and 1996, reporting that smaller countries have lower effective corporate
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tax rates, controlling for other considerations. And Altshuler and Grubert
(2004) analyze changes in effective tax rates for foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
firms between 1992 and 2000, reporting that tax rates fell most sharply for
subsidiaries located in small countries. Given the inclusion of other regressors, among them lagged tax rates, it is, however, difficult to interpret this
finding in the context of theories of tax rate setting.
3.3. Data
Information on country tax policies and their determinants comes from
several sources. Top national statutory corporate tax rates, reported by the
World Tax Database maintained by the University ofMichigan's Office ofTax
Policy Research (http:/ /www.otpr.org), include data for several decades and
a large number of countries. Comprehensive information on the tax obligations of the foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational firms is included among
the data collected by the U.S. Bureau ofEconomicAnalysis (BEA) on the basis
of comprehensive surveys of American multinational firms in 1982, 1989,
1994, and 1999. Companies owning foreign affiliates with significant sales,
assets, or net income are required to provide extensive information concerning their operations, which is then aggregated by country and reported
by the BEA. Information is unavailable for countries in which very few
U.S. firms have foreign operations, because reporting would then threaten
to undermine the confidentiality promised survey respondents. In spite of
these minor omissions, the BEA data are unique in their coverage and accuracy and therefore form the basis of the current analysis and much of what
is known anywhere about the operations of multinational firms. National
economic information is provided by the Penn World Tables, which compile
national income account data on an internationally comparable basis for a
large number of countries?
Statutory corporate tax rates reported by the World Tax Database display
the significant secular decline noted by other researchers. Using a matched
sample of 68 countries, and weighting observations by GDP, average statutory tax rates fell from 45.9 percent in 1982 to 32.9 percent in 1999. The
decline in statutory tax rates was most pronounced in large countries, but
even unweighted average tax rates in this sample of countries fell from 41.3
percent in 1982 to 32.0 percent in 1999.
7

The BEA data are available at http://bea.gov; the Penn World Tables are available at
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu.
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Table 1. Statutory and Effective Corporate Tax Rates
1982

1999

45.9
41.3

32.9
32.0

Statutory Corporate Tax Rates (o/o)
Average weighted by GDP
Unweighted world average

Effective Corporate Tax Rates on U.S. Multinationals (%)
Average weighted by GDP
Unweighted world average

42.6
36.5

26.2
23.9

Note: The table presents information for matched samples of
countries in 1982 and 1999, for 68 of which it is possible to calculate average statutory corporate tax rates and for 45 of which it is
possible to calculate average effective corporate tax rates.

Effective taxes paid by U.S. multinational firms to foreign governments
fell over this time period along with statutory tax rates. These tax rates
are calculated using BEA data and are defined as the ratio of corporate
income taxes paid by all affiliates in a country to total pre-tax net income. In
principle, this has the advantage of reflecting taxes that affiliates actually pay
and thereby capturing the impact of tax holidays, tax credits, and tax base
adjustments such as those to depreciation rules and loss carryforwards and
carrybacks. In practice, however, companies may have negative earnings, so
this measure tends to overstate actual effective tax rates faced by profitable
firms. Hence, the effective tax rate is defined (as in Hines and Rice, 1994) as
the (nonnegative) lesser of the statutory tax rate and the ratio of taxes paid
to pre-tax income.
Effective tax rates exhibit more rapid declines than statutory tax rates over
this time period. In 1982, the average effective tax rate (weighted by GDP)
faced by U.S. firms in 39 foreign countries was 42.6 percent, whereas the
corresponding average rate in the same countries in 1999 was 26.2 percent. 8
Unweighted average effective tax rates likewise declined markedly, from 36.5
percent in 1982 to 23.9 percent in 1999. Table 1 summarizes the average
changes in statutory and effective tax rates. From the information in the
8

Data availability dictates the choice of 1999 and 1982 as the reference years for these tax
rate calculations, but it is noteworthy that the world economy performed poorly in 1982,
whereas many economies expanded rapidly in 1999. It is not clear what impact, if any,
these business cycle conditions might have on measured effective tax rates facing U.S.
firms, though it is reassuring that effective tax rates exhibit the same secular trend as do
statutory tax rates.
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table it appears that, far from seeing some of the benefits of statutory tax
rate reductions lost to tax base expansions, the foreign affiliates of U.S. firms
enjoyed even greater foreign tax reductions than they might have in the
absence of other adjustments to their tax positions.

4. Determinants of Corporate Taxation
The ability to exploit market power affords countries opportunities to extract
rents from foreign investors by imposing high rates of tax on corporate
profits. The incentive to raise corporate tax rates is greater for large countries
whose stock of corporate investment is less elastic with respect to taxation
than is the case for small countries. The purpose of this section is to consider
the extent to which tax policy experience corresponds to this prediction.

4.1. Statutory Tax Rates
The evidence indicates that statutory tax rates were strongly positively correlated with country sizes in 1982 but that this positive correlation had
largely disappeared by 1999. Figure 2 depicts average statutory corporate
tax rates for 68 countries for which it was possible to obtain corporate tax
rate, population, and GDP information for 1982. The two left-most bars
in the chart correspond to 1982, the first bar presenting average statutory
corporate tax rates for countries with below-median populations and the
second presenting average statutory corporate tax rates for countries with
above-median populations. As the bars reveal, smaller countries taxed corporate income at lower rates in 1982 than did larger countries, which is
consistent with theoretical predictions. By 1999, however, this pattern has
largely disappeared. Statutory corporate tax rates are lower for both sets of
countries in 1999 and, in addition, the difference between large and small
countries greatly narrowed. 9
The average tax rates presented in Figure 2 are not adjusted to take account
of differences in country incomes, and the simple division of the world into
small and large countries is a bit crude from the standpoint of identifying the
impact of country size on tax rates. Table 2 presents estimated coefficients
from regressions in which the dependent variable is the statutory tax rate, and

9

Figure 2 presents average statutory tax rates weighted by GDPs. In 1982, small countries had
an average tax rate of38.9 percent, while the average for large countries was 43.7 percent.
In 1999, the average small country tax rate was 31.1 percent, and the average large country
tax rate was 33.8 percent.

50
1982

1999

45
40
35
30
25
N
00

20
15
10
5
0
Small Countries

Large Countries

Small Countries

Figure 2. Statutory Tax Rates, by Year and Country Size
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Table 2. Determinants of Top Statutory Corporate Tax Rates (1982)
(I)

Constant
Ln(Population 1982)

0.288
(0.058)
0.030
(0.014)

(2)
0.394
(0.110)
0.028
(0.013)

-0.026
(0.026)

0.852
(0.198)
-0.193
(0.068)
0.027
(0.008)
-0.028
(0.026)

69
0.06

69
0.11

Ln(Population 1982) 2
Ln(Per capita GDP 1982)

(3)

Ln(Per capita GDP 1982) 2
Number of observations
R-squared

69
0.05

(4)
1.388
(0.622)
0.027
(0.014)

-0.571
(0.351)
0.074
(0.050)
69
0.09

(5)
1.789
(0.609)
-0.190
(0.068)
0.026
(0.008)
-0.548
(0.350)
0.071
(0.045)
69
0.13

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

independent variables include powers of log population and log per capita

GDP. The sample consists of 69 countries for which it is possible to obtain
the necessary data. The estimated 0.030 coefficient on log population in the
first column indicates that larger countries have higher statutory corporate
tax rates; population doubling is associated with 3 percent higher rates in
1982. Adding the log of per capita GDP as an explanatory variable, as in the
regression reported in column 2, reduces the estimated effect of population
only slightly, to 0.028. The addition of a second power oflog GDP has little
effect on the population coefficient, as indicated by the regression reported
in column 4. And the introduction of a second power oflog population, as
in the regressions reported in columns 3 and 5, reveals a nonlinear, indeed
nonmonotone, effect of country size on corporate tax rates, the positive effect
of country size on tax rates being strongest among the larger countries. 10
The sizeable positive impact of national population on statutory corporate
tax rates that is apparent in the 1982 data fails to materialize in 1999. Table
3 reports estimated coefficients from regressions in which the dependent
variable is the 1999 statutory corporate tax rate, and independent variables
10

Appendix Table 1 presents means and standard deviations of variables used in the regressions. The regressions presented in Table 2 are parsimonious, and resolutely so, despite the
temptation to add other explanatory variables, including a standard measure of economic
openness (the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP). Explanatory variables
are restricted to population and GDP in order to estimate the effect of largely exogenous
determinants of tax policies and to focus on the impact of country size independent of
other policy choices.
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Table 3. Determinants of Top Statutory Corporate Tax Rates (1999)

(1)
Constant
Ln(Population 1999)

0.288
(0.039)
0.009
(0.010)

(2)

0.411
(0.062)
0.006
(0.009)

-0.029
(0.013)

0.567
(0.138)
-0.071
(0.060)
0.010
(0.007)
-0.031
(0.013)

111
0.04

111
0.06

Ln(Population 1999) 2
Ln(Per capita GDP 1999)

(3)

Ln(Per capita GDP 1999) 2
Number of observations
R-squared

111
0.01

(4)
0.815
(0.458)
0.005
(0.009)

-0.247
(0.242)
0.029
(0.032)
111
0.05

(5)
0.971
(0.483)
-0.071
(0.060)
0.010
(0.007)
-0.249
(0.243)
0.029
(0.032)
111
0.07

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

are the 1999 values of the same variables used in the regressions reported in
Table 2. Thanks to greater data availability, the sample for the 1999 regression
is considerably larger (111 countries) than that used to analyze the determinants of tax rates in 1982. The estimated coefficients reported in Table 3
have the same signs as their counterparts in Table 2, but are considerably
smaller in magnitude and are statistically insignificant, save for the coefficients on log per capita GDP in the regressions reported in columns 2 and
3. In particular, the estimated 0.58 coefficient on log population reported in
column 2 is less than one-fifth the size of the corresponding 1982 coefficient
and is statistically indistinguishable from zero. To guard against the possibility that the 1999 results reflect mere differences in sample composition,
the regressions were rerun using 1999 data for the 68 countries appearing
in the 1982 sample; 11 the results, which are reported in Appendix Table 2,
are very similar to those reported in Table 3.

4.2. Effective Tax Rates
Corporate tax obligations are the products not merely of statutory tax rates
but also of specific rules by which tax bases are calculated. Figure 3 presents
average effective foreign tax rates for U.S. firms in 1982 and 1999, distinguished by sizes ofhost countries. The height difference of the two left-most
11

The 1999 data do not include information on Taiwan's GDP, so this observation is dropped
from the regressions reported in Appendix Table 2.
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Appendix Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations of Regression Variables
Variable

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Statutory corporate tax rate, 1982
Statutory corporate tax rate, 1999
Ln(population), 1982
Ln(population), 1999
Ln(per capita GDP), 1982
Ln(per capita GDP), 1999
Effective corporate tax rate, 1982
Effective corporate tax rate, 1999
Effective corporate tax rate/Statutory
corporate tax rate, 1982
Effective corporate tax rate/Statutory
corporate tax rate, 1999
Indirect corporate tax revenue/Direct
corporate tax revenue, 1982
Indirect corporate tax revenue/Direct
corporate tax revenue, 1999

0.412
0.320
9.45
9.71
8.70
8.92
0.341
0.224
0.897

0.095
0.060
1.62
1.64
0.94
1.07
0.224
0.127
0.249

0.781

0.329

3.75

3.90

2.89

2.57

Appendix Table 2. Determinants of Top Statutory Corporate Tax Rates ( 1999)
(Sample Restricted to Countries in 1982 Sample)
(1)

Constant
Ln(Population 1999)

0.292
(0.042)
0.007
(0.010)

(2)
0.326
(0.061)
0.006
(0.010)

-0.008
(0.012)

0.452
(0.172)
-0.054
(0.075)
0.007
(0.009)
-0.009
(0.012)

68
0.01

68
0.02

Ln(Population 1999) 2
Ln(Per capita GDP 1999)

(3)

Ln(Per capita GDP 1999) 2
Number of observations
R-squared

68
0.01

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

(4)
0.508
(0.439)
0.006
(0.010)

-0.106
(0.230)
0.013
(0.031)
68
0.01

(5)
0.663
(0.486)
-0.057
(0.076)
0.007
(0.009)
-0.119
(0.234)
0.015
(0.031)
68
0.02
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Table 4. Determinants of Effective Corporate Tax Rates ( 1982)

Constant
Ln(Population 1982)

(I)

(2)

(3)

-0.236
(0.200)
0.036
(0.011)

-0.609
(0.468)
0.043
(0.015)

0.029
(0.028)

0.605
( 1.211)
-0.112
(0.150)
0.005
(0.005)
0.034
(0.029)

45
0.17

45
0.19

Ln(Population 1982) 2
Ln(Per capita GDP 1982)
Ln(Per capita GDP 1982) 2
Number of observations
R-squared

45
0.15

(4)
2.330
(2.262)
0.039
(0.015)

-0.638
(0.505)
0.038
(0.029)
45
0.21

(5)

2.498
(2.405)
-0.012
(0.226)
0.002
(0.007)
-0.582
(0.566)
0.035
(0.032)
45
0.21

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

bars of Figure 3 indicates that U.S.-owned affiliates in small countries faced
substantially lower effective tax rates in 1982 than did U.S.-owned affiliates
in large countries. Effective tax rates were lower in 1999, as indicated by the
two right-most bars of Figure 3, and the difference between average rates in
small and large countries greatly attenuated. 12
Table 4 presents estimated coefficients from regressions explaining effective tax rates in 1982 as functions of the same independent variables as those
used in the regressions presented in Table 2. The estimated 0.036 coefficient
in column 1 indicates that affiliates in larger countries paid greater taxes
for a given level of income, a population doubling being associated with
3.6 percent higher effective tax rates. The estimated effect of country size
increases somewhat with the addition of controls for per capita GDP in the
regressions reported in columns 2 and 4, and does not exhibit important
nonlinearities in the regressions reported in columns 3 and 5.
The positive and significant effect of country size on effective tax rates in
1982 is not repeated in data for 1999. Table 5 presents regressions estimating
the determinants of effective tax rates in 1999. While the point estimates of
the log population coefficients are positive in the regressions reported in
columns 1, 2, and 4, they are considerably smaller in magnitude than the
corresponding coefficients in Table 4 and are not statistically significant. The
12

Figure 3 presents average effective tax rates weighted byGDPs. In 1982, U.S.-owned affiliates
in small countries had average effective tax rates of 31.7 percent, while the average tax rate
of affiliates in large countries was 40.5 percent. In 1999, the average small country effective
tax rate was 23.0 percent, and the average large country tax rate was 27.1 percent.
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Table 5. Determinants of Effective Corporate Tax Rates (1999)

Constant
Ln(Population 1999)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.026
(0.280)
0.013
(0.017)

-0.317
(0.418)
0.020
(0.017)

-3.588
(1.563)
0.427
(0.187)
-0.012
(0.006)
O.Dl5
(0.025)

-1.023
(1.745)
0.020
(0.014)

-3.247
( 1.951)
0.444
(0.193)
-0.013
(0.006)
-0.094
(0.390)
0.006
(0.022)
45
0.16

Ln(Population 1999) 2
Ln(Per capita GDP 1999)

0.025
(0.024)

Ln(Per capita GDP 1999) 2
Number of observations
R-squared

45
0.03

45
0.05

45
0.16

0.185
(0.386)
-0.009
(0.021)
45
0.06

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

regressions reported in columns 3 and 5 of Table 5 suggest the possibility
of a nonlinear effect of country size on effective tax rates, one in which the
impact of greater population declines as populations grow, turning negative for larger countries. This nonlinear pattern differs from that evident
in the regressions in which the statutory tax rate is the dependent variable.
The pattern also differs from the implications of most models in which
countries impose corporate taxes designed to extract rents from inelastic investors, because such models typically imply that the effects of given
changes in country size on tax rates should increase in magnitude as countries grow larger and thereby affect world prices to greater degrees.
4.3. Corporate Tax Bases
One of the functions of the evidence presented in Tables 4 and 5 is to confirm
that the disappearing effect of country size on statutory tax rates, implied
by the regressions presented in Tables 2 and 3, is not merely an artifact of
replacing narrow with broad tax bases, while reducing statutory tax rates,
in larger countries. This leaves open the question of what happened to
corporate tax bases in small and large countries in the period between 1982
and 1999. It is possible to examine this issue directly, and that is the purpose
of the regressions presented in Tables 6 and 7. 13
13

It is worth noting that the chapter's calculations of effective corporate tax rates and corpo-

rate tax bases are based on data on U.S. multinational firms exclusively. Conceivably the
experiences of investors from other countries might differ from those ofU.S. investors, due
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Table 6. Determinants of Corporate Tax Bases (1982)

Constant
Ln(Population 1982)

(I)

(2)

(3)

-0.167
(0.405)
0.064
(0.023)

-1.003
(0.870)
0.080
(0.030)

0.065
(0.045)

-2.606
(2.024)
0.284
(0.257)
-0.006
(0.008)
0.058
(0.049)

45
0.19

45
0.19

Ln(Population 1982) 2
Ln(Per capita GDP 1982)
Ln(Per capita GDP 1982) 2
Number of observations
R-squared

45
0.15

(4)

2.977
(4.074)
0.075
(0.026)

-0.838
(0.910)
0.052
(0.052)
45
0.20

(5)
1.570
(4.271)
0.505
(0.401)
-0.013
(0.012)
-1.303
(1.005)
O.D78
(0.057)
45
0.23

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 7. Determinants of Corporate Tax Bases (1999)
(1)

Constant
Ln(Population 1999)

(2)

(3)

0.047
(0.849)
0.045
(0.051)

-0.713 -10.792
(1.217)
(4.847)
0.059
1.313
(0.051)
(0.591)
-0.038
(0.018)
0.055
0.024
(0.070)
(0.072)

45
0.04

45
0.05

Ln(Population 1999) 2
Ln(Per capita GDP 1999)
Ln(Per capita GDP 1999) 2
Number of observations
R-squared

45
0.18

(4)

(5)

-3.762 -10.433
(4.928)
(5.464)
0.058
1.331
(0.541)
(0.039)
-0.038
(0.016)
0.746
-0.090
(1.090)
(1.093)
-0.038
0.006
(0.061)
(0.061)
45
45
0.18
0.06

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

The dependent variable in the regressions presented in Table 6 is the
ratio of the effective corporate tax rate for U.S. firms to the statutory
corporate rate. This is a measure of the corporate tax base, insofar as it
applies to American firms, normalized by the U.S. accounting definition of

to national differences in the taxation of foreign income, industrial composition of foreign
investment, and other factors. It is not clear whether any of these differences would affect
measured correlations of tax rates and country sizes.
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foreign income. As the estimated 0.064 coefficient in the regression reported
in column 1 of Table 6 indicates, the corporate tax base was broader in
large countries in 1982 than it was in small countries. The effect of country size persists, and indeed increases slightly in magnitude, as controls are
added for per capita GDP in the regressions reported in columns 2 and 4.
The 0.080 coefficient in column 2 implies that, controlling for per capita
income, doubling the size of a country is associated with an 8 percent greater
corporate tax base. Based on the regressions reported in columns 3 and 5,
this effect of country size has little discernable nonlinearity. Total tax obligations are the product of tax rates and tax bases, and it appears that governments oflarge countries in 1982 used both higher tax rates and broader
tax bases to tax corporations more heavily than did governments of small
countries.
Table 7 reports the results of repeating these regressions using data for
1999. Point estimates of coefficients on log population in the regressions
reported in columns 1, 2, and 4 are smaller, and associated standard errors
larger, than in the 1982 regressions, making it impossible to reject the
hypothesis that country size had no effect on corporate tax bases in 1999.
The regressions reported in columns three and five suggest an anomalous
nonlinear effect of population on corporate tax bases, in which the impact
of greater country size diminishes and ultimately becomes negative as country populations grow. The pattern of corporate tax base regressions in 1982
and 1999 is similar to the pattern of effective corporate tax rate regressions
for the same years, suggesting that whatever process was responsible for the
correlation between country size and corporate tax provisions that imposed
heavy burdens in 1982 had largely disappeared by 1999.
4.4. Indirect Taxes
Business activities generate government revenue from many taxes other than
just corporate income taxes, including payroll and personal income taxes
levied on employees, sales taxes, value added taxes, property taxes, excise
taxes, and numerous others. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004a) note that these
indirect tax obligations generally exceed the corporate income tax obligations of foreign affiliates ofU.S. multinational firms, and Christensen, Cline,
and Neubig (2001) find the same to be true of firms in the United States.
It is conceivable that, over the 1982-1999 period, larger countries simply
replaced corporate income taxes with higher rates of indirect business taxes,
thereby changing the tax mix without reducing effective rates of taxation of
business activity. The data do not, however, support such an interpretation.
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Appendix Table 3. Determinants of Indirect/Direct Tax Revenue (1982)

Constant
Ln(Population 1999)

(1)

(2)

7.307
(7.405)
-0.207
(0.426)

-6.516
(13.255)
0.073
(0.497)

Ln(Population 1999) 2
Ln(Per capita GDP 1999)

1.005
(0.683)

Ln(Per capita GDP 1999) 2
Number of observations
R-squared

40
0.01

40
0.03

(3)

(4)

(5)

-38.145 -55.235 -63.744
(29.352) (72.798) (77.951)
2.649
4.118
0.122
(7.547)
(3.577)
(0.521)
-0.123
-0.077
(0.230)
(0.108)
0.847
12.141
9.451
(0.727) (16.301) (18.349)
-0.641
-0.492
(0.937)
(1.047)
40
40
40
0.04
0.05
0.05

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Appendix Table 4. Determinants of Indirect/Direct Tax Revenue (1999)

Constant
Ln(Population 1999)

(I)

(2)

2.408
(3.978)
O.D28
(0.237)

2.026
(11.487)
0.037
(0.349)

Ln(Population 1999) 2
Ln(Per capita GDP 1999)

0.026
(0.663)

Ln(Per capita GDP 1999) 2
Number of observations
R-squared

41
0.00

41
0.00

(3)

(4)

(5)

-19.220 -74.154 -70.119
(21.102) (36.491) (43.311)
-0.068
-0.876
2.638
(2.596)
(0.331)
(4.530)
-0.077
0.024
(0.079)
(0.134)
-0.020
17.670
18.272
(0.695)
(8.174)
(8.940)
-0.987
-1.020
(0.456)
(0.497)
41
41
41
0.01
0.11
0.11

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Appendix Tables 3 and 4 present regressions in which the dependent variable
is the ratio of indirect tax payments by U.S. multinational firms to corporate
income tax payments. 14 This ratio was not systematically related to country
size in either the 1982 or the 1999 sample, suggesting that the determinants
14

Indirect tax payments are defined in the BEA data to include any type of tax other than
income and payroll taxes, as the BEA survey form asks for the sum of sales taxes, value
added taxes, excise taxes; property taxes; and import and export duties. See Desai, Foley,
and Hines (2004a) for further discussion of this variable.

Corporate Taxation and International Competition

291

Appendix Table 5. Simple Effective Corporate Income Tax Rate (1982)
(Revenue as a Fraction ofGDP)
(1)

Constant

5.19
(3.62)
-0.46
(0.86)

Ln(Population 1982)

(2)
9.18
(4.70)
-0.53
(0.85)

Ln(Population 1982) 2
Ln(Per capita GDP 1982)

-0.96
(0.87)

(3)

(4)

15.66
(13.53)
-3.79
(5.65)
0.41
(0.68)
-1.01
(0.93)

-44.12
(24.60)
-0.47
(0.81)

Ln(Per capita GDP 1982) 2
Number of observations
R-squared
Note:

50
0.0088

50
0.0216

50
0.0296

(5)

-42.46
(27.82)
-6.16
(5.87)
0.72
(0.73)
28.34
33.57
(14.14)
(17.25)
-3.98
-4.71
( 1.94)
(2.36)
50
50
0.0704
0.0933

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

of indirect tax rates are similar to the determinants of direct tax rates, a
pattern that is consistent with the high correlation of the two taxes reported
by Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004a).

4.5. Total Corporate Tax Collections
Total corporate income tax collections are the product of corporate investment, corporate profitability, the corporate tax base, and statutory corporate tax rates. Given the complexity of the factors involved, the endogeneity
of tax policies to economic conditions, and the endogeneity of corporate
investment to corporate income tax rates, it is perhaps nai:ve to expect total
corporate income tax collections to be related in a systematic way to country size. Appendix Tables 5 and 6 nonetheless present regressions in which
the dependent variable is the ratio of corporate income tax collections to
GDP for countries for which it is possible to obtain the necessary data. The
regressions reveal no discernable impact of country size on corporate tax
collections in either 1982 or 1999, though, given the size of the associated
standard errors, it is difficult to rule out many hypotheses on the basis of these
results. Total corporate tax collections are the sum of revenues received from
taxing inbound FDI and revenues from taxing income earned by domestic
businesses. Hence, the absence of a country size effect on total corporate tax
collections is consistent with the possibility of very different determinants
of tax burdens facing foreign and domestic investors, particularly for 1982.
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Appendix Table 6. Simple Effective Corporate Income Tax Rate ( 1999)

(Revenue as a Fraction ofGDP)

Constant
Ln(Population 1999)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

1.00
(1.48)
0.34
(0.36)

-3.57
(1.65)
0.42
(0.34)

-4.86
(6.00)
1.03
(2.82)
-0.07
(0.34)
1.09
(0.40)

1.15
(12.13)
0.43
(0.34)

Ln(Population 1999) 2
Ln(Per capita GDP 1999)

1.08
(0.40)

Ln(Per capita GDP 1999) 2
Number of observations
R-squared
Note:

63
0.0264

63
0.1232

63
0.1244

-1.44
(6.46)
0.33
(0.88)
63
0.1249

(5)
0.40
(13.67)
1.20
(2.70)
-0.09
(0.33)
-1.89
(6.12)
0.39
(0.83)
63
0.1268

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

5. Conclusion
The evidence points to a systematic change in the pattern of international
tax rate setting during the period in which international capital mobility
greatly increased. In 1982, large countries subjected corporate income to
significantly higher rates of taxation than did small countries, but by 1999
these differences were no longer so apparent. Statutory corporate tax rates fell
around the world over the same years, while corporate tax bases broadened
to compensate for the revenue effects of tax rate reductions - except for
foreign investors, whose average effective tax rates fell dramatically.
This pattern of international tax rate setting suggests that tax competition stiffened substantially since the early 1980s. Countries that previously exploited their positions as capital importers and as leaders in setting
tax rates by imposing high corporate tax rates increasingly found themselves competing with other jurisdictions to attract mobile investment. As
a result, tax rates on mobile investment fell, though countries maintained
their (higher) rates of tax on less mobile domestic investment. This evolution of corporate tax policy is the logical outcome of greater competition
between countries to attract investment, and, if anything, intensified corporate tax competition should be expected to lead to further pressures for
corporate tax rate reductions. Whether this is a welcome or a regrettable
development may turn on the form that these future tax changes take.
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